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COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS-SOME
"SOFTSPOTS" IN SECTION 341
STUART I. ODELL*
The color of vernacular is rare, indeed, in the staid vernacular
of legal verbosity known as the Internal Revenue Code. Only
once in a decade does a word creep into that catacomb which is
at once precise, descriptive, suggestive, conversational and
warm-a word not of art but of an artist. Such is the word
"collapsible" in the title "collapsible corporations."f
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Historical Background
In 1950, in response to an increased use by taxpayers of the col-
lapsible corporation device,' Congress passed an amendment to the In-
* Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor, Freshmen
Legal Writing & Analysis Seminars, University of Miami School of Law. Altman, Collapsible
Corporations, 28 TAXES 1013 (1950).
t Altman, Collapsible Corporations, 28 TAXES 1013 (1950).
1. Prior to 1950, the Internal Revenue Service was not equipped, either statutorily or
judicially, to cope with the corporate device which taxpayers were utilizing to avoid ordi-
nary income tax rates. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 96-99 (1950) ; S. REP.
No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 88-91 (1950). The Internal Revenue Service unsuccessfully
employed three basic arguments in a futile attempt to combat the collapsible corporation
device.
1) The Commissioner argued that the corporate entity was a sham and should be dis-
regarded for tax purposes. The courts answered this by finding that the factors surrounding
the entity were indigenous to a corporation, that the entity was engaged in normal cor-
porate activity, and that a corporation does not lose its identity merely because it is or-
ganized for a single purpose. See Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369, 374-75 (S.D. Cal.
1952).
2) The argument was advanced that the corporation was guilty of anticipatory assign-
ment of income and that the basic Fruit-Tree Doctrine should be applied. United States v.
Joliet & Chicago R.R., 315 U.S. 44 (1942); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). The courts
answered that the principles governing anticipatory assignments were inapplicable because
the corporation was dissolved by liquidation prior to the time when the income was earned
and, therefore, the income resulting from the original corporate activity was not attributable
to the corporation because it was no longer in existence. See Herbert v. Riddell, supra.
3) The third argument was that a corporation could not perform all preliminary mat-
ters relating to a sale of its assets and then dissolve and pass the benefit of the contract of
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ternal Revenue Code of 1939.2 The purpose of this amendment was to
defeat a scheme "whereby one or more individuals attempt to convert
the profits from their participation in a project from income taxable at
ordinary rates to long-term capital gain taxable only at the rate of 25
per cent."'
It appears that the collapsible corporation first came into vogue
with the businesses providing entertainment, particularly, the motion
picture industry.4 Actors, directors, writers and others who were in the
higher tax brackets and whose salaries would have been taxable as or-
dinary income, utilized temporary, one-picture corporations as devices
for converting the value of their services into corporate assets, repre-
sented by corporate stock. When the film was completed, the corporation
was either liquidated and the assets distributed to the shareholders in
exchange for their stock, or the appreciated stock was sold outright. If
the corporation were liquidated, the basis of the assets in the hands of
the distributees would be its fair market value.' At that time, the dis-
tributees would realize gain to the extent that the fair market value of
the film received in'liquidation exceeded the basis of the shares they re-
linquished.' If the stock were sold outright, the gain would be realized
to the extent that the sales price exceeded the basis of the stock.' Since
ordinary income would normally flow from the film-producing activities,
the corporate device enabled the stockholders to convert their ordinary
income producing activities into a capital asset and thereby take ad-
vantage of the lower tax rates granted to the privileged sale or exchange
of capital assets held in excess of six months.'
sale to its shareholders. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). This
theory was rejected on the ground that the corporation was not engaged in negotiating a
sale, but only in dissolving the corporation assets. Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955); Frank
E. Gilman 14 T.C. 833 (1950).
For an article suggesting possible non-legislative solutions, see Bittker & Redlick, Cor-
porate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REv. 437 (1950).
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(m), added by ch. 994, § 212, 64 Stat. 934 (1950). The
first regulations adopted under section 117(m) were issued on March 26, 1953. Treas. Reg.
118, § 39.117(m)-I (1953).
3. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 96 (1950).
4. Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952) ; Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376
(1955). See Taubman, Motion Picture Co-Production Deals and Theatrical Business Or-
ganization, 11 TAx L. Rv. 113 (1956).
5. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 334(a). The basis of property received in liquida-
tion is a separate subject and outside the scope of this paper. See generally Merritt, Real
Estate: Methods of Acquisition-Assets or Stock? N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX 235, 252
(1956).
6. The distributee also received a stepped-up basis for the property. In the case of a
film (or any depreciable, amortizable or depletable property), the stepped-up basis enabled
the distributee to offset the income earned by the film with a high depreciation expense.
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001, 1002.
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201, 1202, 1221, 1223, 1231, 1245. There is a possibility
that the stock will not be a capital asset with respect to a particular taxpayer. An example
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Later on, the collapsible corporation device was seized upon by
builders of apartment projects using mortgages insured by the Federal
Housing Administration.9 Judging from the reported cases, it apparently
was possible, in some instances, for the builder to secure a larger F.H.A.
loan than was required to finance the building. The usual pattern seems
to have been to incorporate and issue more than one class of stock. Upon
completion of the project, the building would then be written up above
its actual cost, thereby creating a revaluation surplus, usually equal to
the amount by which the F.H.A. loan exceeded the actual construction
cost. The revaluation surplus would then be used to redeem some of the
stock and thus would be put into the hands of the incorporators as an
apparent capital gain.10
Section 117(m),11 was intended to prevent these practices by treat-
ing gain that fell within its purview as gain from the sale of property
that is not a capital asset. 2 Several amendments to the original amen-
datory statute became necessary due to a failure of the original enact-
ment to embrace some specific abuses. A minor amendment, adopted in
1951, was aimed specifically at the whiskey industry." In 1954, a broad
revision of the collapsible corporation provisions was included in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 That statute was given its present sec-
tion number, 341, and was considered to have solved the collapsible cor-
is where the taxpayer is a dealer in securities and the stock sold is part of his inventory.
Any gain on a sale or liquidation would result in ordinary income.
9. Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958); Commissioner v. Gross,
236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956); Paul Braude, 35 T.C. 1158 (1961) ; Elizabeth M. August, 30
T.C. 969 (1958); W. H. Weaver, 25 T.C. 1067 (1956); Thomas Wilson, 25 T.C. 1058 (1956).
See Rev. Rul. 57-357, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 900, stating that distributions of excess mortgage
proceeds, subsequent to December 31, 1949, should be taken into consideration in deter-
mining whether a corporation is collapsible and whether any gain is subject to the col-
lapsible corporation provisions.
10. In addition to the distribution of excess mortgage proceeds, some of the construc-
tion corporations were liquidated, either completely or partially. Any gain on the liquidation
would also receive capital gains treatment, although the increase in value was due to the
construction activity.
11. Supra note 2.
12. Gain from the sale or exchange . . . of stock of a collapsible corporation, to
the extent that it would be considered . . . as gain from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset held for more than 6 months, shall . . . be considered as gain from the
sale or exchange of property which is not a capital asset. Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 117(m)(1).
13. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, ch. 994, § 212, 64 Stat. 934 (1950), as amended, 65 Stat. 502
(1951). Individuals were transferring whiskey inventories to a corporation in exchange for
its stock. Whiskey appreciates in value merely by the passage of time (aging), and the ap-
preciation produces ordinary income when the whiskey is sold. By selling the appreciated
stock or liquidating the corporation and receiving the whiskey in exchange for the stock,
taxpayers were converting ordinary income into capital gains. The amendment prevented
this result by including purchased property within the definition of a collapsible corporation.
This amendment was made applicable to tax years ending after August 31, 1951, with
respect to gains realized after that date.
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341. The 1954 amendments were enacted, in the words
of the Senate Finance Committee, "with a view to strengthening . . . effectiveness" of the
law. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 260 (1954).
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poration problem. The 1954 enactment closed the "loopholes" so securely
that subsection (e) was subsequently enacted to provide relief to tax-
payers. 5 Subsection (e) marks the last collapsible corporation legisla-
tion to date.
Few legislative enactments have engendered as much literary en-
thusiasm in tax circles as the enactment of the collapsible corporation
provisions.' Because of this mass of literature on the subject, the scope
of this paper will be confined to an analysis and discussion of some of
the "softspots" that have evolved. Some consideration will also be given
to the practical aspects of the various "softspots." It will become evident
to the reader that the interplay between the code, the Service, and the
practitioner has resulted in a rather complex situation.
B. The Statute in General
The labyrinth of section 341 does not easily lend itself to simplifica-
tion; yet, its basic pattern must first be grasped before the "softspots"
can be examined. The chart on page 650 is intended to give the reader an
insight into the structure of section 341. The following discussion is
merely a predicate for an understanding of the chart. It is suggested that
if the reader is unfamiliar with the collapsible corporation provisions,
the code sections alluded to should be read in conjunction with this
article.
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e), as amended, 72 Stat. 1615 (1958). Subsection
(e)(12) was added in 1962.
16. The following bibliography represents some, but not all of the articles written on
collapsible corporations since its enactment. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 299-320 (stud. ed. 1962); Altman, Collapsible Corporations; 1957
Developments, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX 659 (1958); Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation
of 1958: The Corporate Election and Collapsible Amendment, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1146
(1958); Anthoine, Recent Developments in Collapsible Corporations, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON
FED. TAX 761 (1956).; Axelrad, Collapsible Corporations and Collapsible Partnerships, 1960
So. CALIF. TAX INST. 269; Axelrad, Recent Developments in Collapsible Corporations, 36
TAXES 893 (1958); Axelrad & Kostas, A Re-examination of Collapsible Corporations "With
a view to" Co-existing with Section 341, 1956 So. CALIF. TAX INST. 549; Cavitch, Collaps-
ible Corporations, 13 W. RES. L. REV. 278 (1962); Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, A
Proposed Revision of the Sale of a Business Enterprise-American Law Institute Draft, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1954); Conner, Collapsible Corporations-A Question of Intent, 3
WM. & M. L. REV. 483 (1962); DeWind & Anthoine, Collapsible Corporations, 56 COLtr.
L. REV. 475 (1956); Donaldson, Collapsible Corporations, 36 TAXES 777 (1958); Landry,
Some Tax Considerations in the Sale or Purchase of a Corporate Business, 9 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 210 (1958); Mandel, Twelve-Month Liquidations and Collapsibility of Real Estate
Corporations, N.Y.U. 21ST. INST. ON FED. TAX 715 (1963); Miller, Capital Gains Taxation
Under the Revenue Act of 1950, N.Y.U. 9TH INST. ON FED. TAX 675, 683-90 (1951);
Modrall, Collapsible Corporations and Subsection (e), 37 TAXES 895 (1959); Nordberg,
"Collapsible" Corporations and the "View," 40 TAXES 372 (1962) ; Peel, Recent Collapsible
Developments: Inadvertent Collapsibility, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX 850 (1962);
Taubman, Motion Picture Co-Production Deals and Theatrical Business Organization, 11
TAX L. REV. 113 (1956); Note, Relief for Collapsible Corporations Under Subsection (e),
51 GEO. L.f. 346 (1963); Note, Taxation-Collapsible Corporations-Judicial Interpreta-
tion of "Substantial" Part of Net Income, 8 N.Y.L.F. 544 (1962); Note, Legislative Re-
sponse to the Collapsible Corporation, 51 CoLum. L. REV. 361 (1951).
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Section 341 (and its predecessor) attacks the collapsible corpora-
tion device on the shareholder level rather than on the corporate level.
The remedial effect of the statute is punitive in nature in that any gain
that falls within its purview receives ordinary income treatment. Section
341(a) provides that in three situations, gain which would otherwise be
treated as realized from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held in
excess of six months, will be treated as gain from the sale or exchange of
a non-capital asset. Subsection (a) is applicable when a corporation
meets the definition of "collapsibility" as it is defined in subsection (b).
Section 341(c) creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of collapsible
status if certain criteria are met. Subsection (d) is composed of three
limitations upon the application of subsection (a) but it does not alter
collapsible status for other purposes. 7 A highly objective test is super-
imposed by subsection (e) which operates independently from the rest
of section 341, and serves to eliminate taxpayers who can comply with
its provisions from the coverage of section 341 (a).18
The chart on page 650 is intended to present the basic provisions of
section 341 in a simplified manner. Appropriate citations are made to
the specific code sections.
17. For example, a corporation falling within the definition of a collapsible corporation
cannot liquidate under § 337, notwithstanding that a limitation in § 341(d) limits the appli-
cation of § 341(a). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 337(c)(1).
18. See II(F) of this article's text infra.
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b) (1).
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b) (2) (A).
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b).(2) (B).
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(2)(C).
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(3).
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(3)(A).
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(3),(B).
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(3)(C).
27. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b) (3) (D).
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(1)(A).
29. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(1)(B).
30. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(a)(1).
31. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(a)(2).
32. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(a),(3).
33. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(a).
34. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d)(1).
35. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d).
36. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d)(2).
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d),(3). The use of installment sales to permit the
three-year period to run has been adversely received by the Treasury. See Rev. Rul. 60-68,
1961-1 Cu-m. BULL. 151.
38. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(c) (1) (A).
39. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(c)(2)(A)-(C).
40. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(c) (1) (B).
41. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(c)(1).
42. See I(F) of this article's text infra.
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COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS
I. SOME "SOFTSPOTS"
A. "With a View to"-A Question of Subjective Intent
43
In order for a corporation to be collapsible, among other things, it
must be formed or availed of with a "view" to the sale or exchange of its
stock, or a distribution of its property.4" Since the enactment of the stat-
ute, the "view" requirement has been the subject of extensive contro-
versy.45 The original enactment in 1950 used the same terminology as
the present provision; hence, decisions under the prior provisions are
still applicable.4"
The determination as to whether the requisite "view" exists is bas-
ically a factual determination of subjective intent.47 The regulations,
however, explicitly state that the "view" must exist prior to completion
of manufacture, production, construction or purchase referred to in sec-
tion 341(b)." The "view" need not be a positive one, but may be con-
templated conditionally, unconditionally, or as a recognized possibility.
The protesting taxpayer need not be the party with the "view."4 It is
only necessary that the "view" be contemplated by those persons in a
position to determine the policies of the corporation, whether by reason
of owning a majority of the voting stock of the corporation or other-
wise." If the sale, exchange, or distribution is attributable to circum-
stances that arose after the manufacture, construction, production or
purchase, other than circumstances which could have been reasonably
anticipated at the time of the activity, the corporation shall, in the ab-
sence of compelling facts to the contrary, be considered not to have been
formed or availed of with the requisite "view." 1 The superimposition of
these regulations on the code substitutes a semi-objective standard for
the subjective one found in the code provisions.
43. See generally Conner, Collapsible Corporations-A Question of Intent, 3 WM. & M.
L. REV. 483 (1962).
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b) (1) (A).
45. The following cases turned upon the "view to" question: Jacobson v. Commissioner,
281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960); Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 825 (1960); Sidney v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1958); Burge
v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Shilowitz v. United States, CCH 1963
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) fT 9690 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 1963); Elliott v.
United States, 205 F. Supp. 384 (D. Ore. 1962); Jack D. Saltzman, CCH TAX CT. MEM.
ff 7412(M) (March 18, 1963); Southwest Properties, Inc., 38 T.C. 97 (1962); Charles J.
Riley, 35 T.C. 848 (1961); Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. 906 (1961); Carl B. Rechner, 30 T.C.
186 (1958).
46. Compare Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(m) (2) (A, with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 341(b)(1).
47. The text of the code suggests the subjective intent. The regulations attempt to
substitute an objective standard by stating that the "view to" requirement is met "whether
such action was contemplated unconditionally, conditionally, or as a recognized possibility."
Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(2) (1955).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(3) (1955).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(2) (1955).
50. Ibid.
51. Supra note 49.
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Since the intent to collapse must, under the regulations, exist or be
reasonably anticipated during the construction period, it is important to
know when the construction period ends." The courts have been very
strict in delimiting the definition of construction,58 sometimes to the point
of absurdity.54 They have refused to accept the proposition that con-
struction ends when the building is substantially completed,55 but have
relaxed the definition to the extent of holding that construction was com-
plete despite uncompleted landscaping, walks, driveways and steps,
when the building was fully rented and producing income. 6
In contrast to the specificity of the regulations, the courts have been
so disharmonized by the "view" element that the decisions seem to have
no relation to one another. However, a pattern emerges when each judi-
cial level is examined independently.
The Tax Court has gone through a stage of vacillation, first rejecting
the position of the regulations 7 and then adopting it."8 Today, the Tax
Court adheres to the regulations and requires that the "view" exist prior
to completion of construction. The district courts will not be considered
independently because they presumably follow the precedent of their
corresponding courts of appeals.
In contrast to the uniformity of decision now present on the Tax
Court level, the courts of appeals are still in conflict. The four circuits
that have ruled upon this point are currently split two - two. In Burge
v. Commissioner,59 the Fourth Circuit rejected the regulations as being
too liberal and announced that the "view" requirement is satisfied if it
is present at the time the corporation is "availed of." This means, in
effect, that if a sale, exchange, or distribution takes place prior to a re-
52. It is also important to know when construction is completed for purposes of
determining whether the three-year limitation in § 341(d) is applicable. See the chart
on page 650 and note 37 supra.
53. "[U]nder the correct interpretation of the statute, 'construction' should be defined
technically to mean all construction required to perform the contract completely." Glickman
v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1958). See J. D. Abbott, 28 T.C. 795 (1957),
aff'd, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958) (held that improvements to real estate such as adding
sewers, water, streets, etc., were sufficient "construction" to come within the collapsible
corporation provisions). See also Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 178.
54. See Max Mintz, 32 T.C. 723 (1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960) (held that
construction was not complete when as little as 1.6 % of the job remained to be done),
and Edward Weil, 28 T.C. 809 (1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958) (held that
construction was incomplete when all that remained to be done was to put up a retaining
wall and finish the parking lot).
55. Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958), afirming, 26 P-H TAX
CT. ME.m. 451 (1957).
56. Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. 906 (1961). See Vernon W. McPherson, 31 P-H TAX
CT. MFmv. 645 (1962), wherein the Tax Court held that the filing of a tentative plot is
not a step in construction. See also Rev. Rul. 63-114, 1963 INT. REV. BULL. No. 24, at 9.
57. Carl B. Rechner, 30 T.C. 186 (1958).
58. Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. 906 (1961); Charles J. Riley, 35 T.C. 848 (1961);
Elizabeth M. August, 30 T.C. 969 (1958).
59. 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 825 (1960).
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alization of a substantial amount of income, the "view" is present and
the corporation will be collapsible if the other provisions of the statute
are satisfied. Strangely enough, this position was taken in a case in which
the facts strongly supported a finding that the "view" existed prior to
completion of construction.6" The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its position
in a later decision.6 ' The Second Circuit adopted the Burge doctrine in
Glickman v. Commissioner,2 although it was dictum in that case.63 It
later reaffirmed this position,64 but again it was dictum because the
"view" was found to exist during construction.65
Of the two circuits that explicitly rejected the Burge doctrine and
adopted the regulations, the Fifth Circuit was the first. In Payne v. Com-
missioner,66 the court said:
[W]e recognize that... [the position of the Second and Fourth
Circuits] seems to overlook the requirement by the statute that
the corporation must be availed of for construction of property
with a view to a distribution, etc .... [T]his means that unless
the "view" is held before or during construction, the statute is
not satisfied.67
The Third Circuit followed suit a year later,6 by merely saying that it
agreed with the Fifth Circuit on this point.
It is curious to note that the above split does not explain all of the
judicial disharmony. Part of the cause can be attributed to a tendency,
60. Taxpayer's testimony that he embarked upon the enterprise with a view of
making a permanent investment in an apartment house, is very largely discredited
by the fact that his initial investment was only $100, that the corporate charter
was so drawn as to allow the early retirement of the Class B stock which was re-
tired as soon as the building was completed, with taxpayer and his associate drawing
out the surplus money derived from the loan instead of leaving it in the treasury
of the corporation . . . , that arrangements were entered into almost immediately
to sell the Class A stock and that the Class A stock was sold within less than three
months after the completion of the building. Id. at 768-69.
61. Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960).
62. 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958).
63. The case held that a corporation need not be liquidated to fall within the purview
of § 117(m) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939.
64. Sidney v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1960).
65. This case was further complicated because the "view" was found to exist prior
to enactment of the 1950 collapsible corporation provisions, and the corporations was
"availed of" after its enactment. The court said that it made no difference. It found
§ 117(m) applicable to taxable years ending after December 31, 1949, on gain realized
after that date, notwithstanding that the "view" was formulated and construction had
ceased prior to that date.
66. 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959).
67. Id. at 620. The quotation indicates that the Fifth Circuit found support for its
position in the code provisions. However, most experts agree that the position of the
regulations represents administrative legislation-i.e., there is no support for the regulations
in the code or the legislative history.
68. Jacobson v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960). The court specifically
rejected Glickman and followed Treas. Reg. § 29.117-11 (1951), the predecessor of the
current regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.341-1(3) (1955).
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by some of the courts in the earlier decisions, to find a tax avoidance
intent on the part of the taxpayer."9 This attitude, no doubt, can be
traced to the statutory purpose stated in the committee reports that pre-
ceded the passage of the statute.7 ° Although the structure of the statute
does not include this tax avoidance intent, or its absence, some recent
decisions continue to maintain this overtone.7 '
Although the regulations do not find support for their position in
the code provisions, they do help the practitioner evaluate his position in
a given case. The split in the circuits on this point does not destroy the
usefulness of the regulations unless the Internal Revenue Service ad-
vocates a position contrary to its own regulations. The discretion of the
government attorney in adopting a position contrary to the regulations
will not be discussed, but it must happen occasionally, or Burge and
Glickman would never have been decided. Thus far, the Supreme Court
has refused to settle this question, 2 and unless a rash of cases on this
point appears, it is unlikely that it will settle the conflict.
B. The Minority Shareholder-The Lowery Line
7
1
A new doctrine has recently evolved from the efforts of the Tax
Court to determine the existence of the elusive "view" element that is
necessary for collapsible status. In order for a corporation to be col-
lapsible, it must be formed or availed of with a "view" to a sale or ex-
change of its stock, or a distribution, etc.74 The regulations state that
this requirement is satisfied if the action (sale, exchange or distribution)
was contemplated unconditionally, conditionally or as a recognized pos-
sibility by those persons in a position to determine the policies of the
corporation, whether by reason of their owning a majority of voting stock
or otherwise.
7 5
69. See Note, Legislative Response to the Collapsible Corporation, 51 COLUM. L. REv.
361, 364-67 (1951).
70. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
71. United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961).; Shilowitz v. United States,
CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 1 9690 (D.N.J. August 30, 1963).
72. Spangler v. Commissioner, supra note 61.
73. The Lowery Line is a phrase created by the author to designate a doctrine that
has recently evolved from two Tax Court cases and a Court of Claims decision. Sylvester
J. Lowery, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEm. DEC. 39,100 (March 21, 1963); Ralph J. Solow,
P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 63,087 (March 27, 1963); Goodwin v. United States,
CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) IT 9603 (Ct. Cl., July 12, 1963). To
the author's knowledge, this paper is the first written examination of what seems to be a
newly emerging doctrine. The Lowery Line is basically a "view to" problem.
74. Supra note 44. In order to spotlight the exact point under consideration, it must
be assumed that all the requisites pertaining to collapsibility are present, with the exception
of the "view" element. Thus, assume that the sole question involved in determining col-
lapsible status is whether the corporation was formed or availed of "with a view to" a
sale or exchange of its stock, or a distribution, prior to a realization by the corporation of
a substantial amount of taxable income to be derived from its Section 341 Assets.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(2) 1955. See also notes 49 & 50 supra, and accompanying text.
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Consider a shareholder owning more than five per cent 76 and less
than fifty per cent of the voting stock. It is obvious that he cannot ex-
ercise control over the policies of the corporation through his stock in-
terest alone; 77 hence, he either fits into the "or otherwise" requirement
or the "view" is lacking. When a corporation has a single shareholder
who owns a majority interest and actively participates in management,
it would seem that any sale, exchange or distribution by or to a minority
shareholder when the majority shareholder retains control78 would es-
cape collapsible treatment because the requisite "view" is lacking.79
There are two recent decisions of the Tax Court and one by the
Court of Claims that seem to follow the above reasoning. In Sylvester
J. Lowery,8° decided in March, 1963, the petitioner was a minority share-
holder in four corporations, each of which was engaged in the construc-
tion of a high rise apartment house to be held for rental purposes upon
completion of construction. In two of these corporations all the share-
holders disposed of their stock prior to a realization by the corporations
of a substantial amount of income to be derived from the property. The
Tax Court found that the requisite "view" existed and therefore, the
corporation was collapsible. 8' The petitioner owned forty per cent and
thirty per cent of the outstanding stock of the other two corporations.
He sold his stock while the principal assets of the corporations were still
in the process of being constructed, and while the majority shareholders
were in control. The Tax Court found that since those in control of the
policies of the corporation had retained their controlling stock interest,
76. A shareholder owning less than 5 % of the voting stock can always escape § 341(a)
because of § 341(d) (1). See the chart on page - and note 34 supra.
77. This statement assumes several facts that are necessary throughout this section of
the paper. First, unless otherwise indicated, the majority of the stock of any corporation
discussed herein, i.e., 51% or more, is owned or controlled by one individual. Second, the
board of directors that makes the policy decisions of the corporation is composed of the
actual stockholders, and their degree of control is in direct proportion to their stock
interest. This is not an unrealistic presumption in the case of a close corporation which
is usually the kind that runs afoul of the collapsible corporation provisions.
78. The retention of control by the majority shareholder is essential to this line of
reasoning. However, it is possible that those in control of the policies of the corporation at
the time it is formed or availed of, possess the "view" to a sale of their stock prior to a
realization of a substantial amount of income but, as of the date of sale by the minority
shareholder, they have not yet sold their stock. Under these facts, it seems that the sale
by the minority shareholder falls within the letter of the statute.
79. It is contended that even though the minority shareholder intends to dispose of
his interest in the corporation prior to a realization by the corporation of a substantial
amount of its taxable income, and that this "view" existed prior to completion of con-
struction, this is not the "view" contemplated by the regulations, since they are written in
terms of the "view" of those in control of the policies of the corporation. Suppose,
however, that the majority stockholder contemplated a redemption of the minority shares
outstanding, but not of his own shares. Must the "view" by those in control of the policies
of the corporation be as to all the shares, their own shares, or any shares? There has
been no answer offered by the courts so that one can only guess. It is the author's guess
that the "view" requirement would be satisfied.
80. P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEm. DEc. 39,100 (March 21, 1963).
81. Id. at 708.
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the corporation was not formed or availed of with a view to collapsing,
and therefore, the gain realized by the minority shareholder would not
fall within section 341. The court emphasized the fact that the petitioner
was forced to sell his interest because he was unable to supply additional
capital that was needed to complete construction.82 It is interesting to
note that the petitioner was, by occupation, engaged in "placing" mort-
gages; 83 that he performed these services for the corporations; that at
least part of the appreciation in value of the petitioner's stock was due
to these services; 84 and, that he was permitted to treat the gain on the
sale of his stock as long-term capital gain.
Although the Lowery Line was not advanced until recently, 8 it was
not long in being utilized. The rationale was employed only a few weeks
after the rendition of the Lowery decision in another Tax Court case,
Ralph J. Solow.86 The court permitted a minority shareholder to treat
the gain on the sale of his stock in a corporation engaged in the construc-
tion of an apartment house, as gain on the sale of a capital asset held in
excess of six months. The taxpayer had never been in a position to fix
the policies of the corporation and the sale of his stock could not have
been reasonably anticipated at the time he acquired his interest. Here, as
in Lowery, the majority shareholders, i.e., those in control of the policies
of the corporation, did not dispose of their interests. The Tax Court re-
lied directly upon Lowery,"' but there was a conspicuous absence of lan-
guage to the effect that the minority shareholder was forced to sell his
interestdue to an unanticipated need for additional capital.
The latest decision along the Lowery Line was Goodwin v. United
States,8" decided in July, 1963, by the United States Court of Claims.
In this case, the taxpayer owned a twenty-five per cent interest in C
Corporation. C owned all the stock in A Corporation which, in turn, held
title to an apartment house built by C. Certain personal difficulties arose
between the majority shareholder and the taxpayer. The taxpayer con-
82. In our opinion section 117(m) [now section 341] was not intended to apply
where, as here, a minority shareholder is compelled, because of circumstances over
which he has no control, to dispose of his investment in a corporation which is
thereafter continued in operation by the majority shareholders. Id. at 710.
(Emphasis added.)
83. The phrase "placing" mortgages refers to the occupation of obtaining temporary
and permanent financing for contractors and purchasers of property. In return for these
services, a placement fee is charged that is taxed to the recipient as ordinary income.
84. Many proposed construction projects get no further than the drawing board because
financing is unavailable. Thus, the placement of mortgages, both permanent and temporary,
is often a service that adds considerable value to the entire project.
85. Prior to the Lowery decision, there are no reported cases advancing the Lowery
Line. See note 73 supra.
86. P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. ff 63,087 (March 27, 1963).
87. "We therefore must rely on Sylvester J. Lowery . . . and hold that petitioner's gain
on the sale of his relevant shares was not within the purview of section 117(m) and the
corresponding regulations. Id. at 457.
88. CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) f 9603 (Ct. CI., July 12,
1963).
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tributed his shares of stock to a partnership and they were subsequently
redeemed by C. The court specifically found "that the redemption or
sale of the stock by [the taxpayer] ... was attributable to circumstances
present during construction."' 9 Yet, it followed Lowery and Solow,
holding:
The essence of the Tax Court's ruling [in Lowery and Solow]
is that the collapsible corporation provisions are not applicable
in a case in which a minority stockholder has his stock re-
deemed and the majority stockholder continues to own the cor-
poration .... [W]e hold that ... [the taxpayer's] gain should
be treated as long-term capital gain.9 0
Whether the Court of Claims really followed the essence of the
Lowery and Solow cases is questionable. There were strong factual situ-
ations in both Lowery and Solow to support the absence of the requisite
"view." In Lowery, the court relied upon the involuntary nature of the
sale. In Solow, it was specifically found that the petitioner was a mere
investor who had no control over the policies of the corporation and
could not reasonably have anticipated the decision to sell when he made
his initial investment. In Goodwin, however, the circumstances which led
to the redemption were found to be present during construction and,
therefore, could have been reasonably anticipated. There was no finding
of fact that the taxpayer was forced to sell or that he had no control over
the policies of the corporation. In fact, the taxpayer was vice-president,
secretary, and project manager of C. Thus, it is deducible that the tax-
payer did have some degree of control over the policies of C.
A respectable argument can be made in favor of the Lowery Line.
The doctrine is predicated upon the notion that since a minority share-
holder normally cannot control the policies of the corporation, the cor-
poration normally would not be formed or availed of with the requisite
"view" even though it was entertained by that particular shareholder. 1
However, this reasoning fails under close scrutiny. For example, sup-
pose a corporation is owned by three shareholders, each having a one-
third interest. Two shareholders must act in concert to formulate and
control policy. Suppose two of the shareholders disagreed as to the policy
of the corporation with regard to a subsequent sale or exchange. Does
the position of the third shareholder which breaks the stalemate make
him the controller of policy? What about a subsequent sale by the share-
holder who dissents to the sale but is overridden by the others? 2 Further,
what should be the treatment of the gain on a sale of stock by the share-
89. Id. at 438.
90. Id. at 440.
91. If the minority shareholder sells his interest while the majority interest is retained,
there is no implication raised that the "view" existed.
92. On its face it would seem that the "view" is present because those in control
of the policies had the "view."
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holder who dissents in favor of selling but is outvoted by the other two
shareholders who retain their interests?9"
A closer situation occurs when two stockholders each own one-half
of the capital stock of a corporation. Policy cannot be formulated with-
out concurrence. Suppose one stockholder had the requisite "view" while
the other did not. Would a sale or exchange by the stockholder with the
"view" fall within the Lowery Line? A recent decision by the United
States District Court for New Jersey, Shilowitz v. United States,4 had
overtones of this issue. The taxpayer, an architect, and another person
formed a corporation to build and operate an apartment house, each re-
ceiving one-half of the capital stock. While construction was still in
progress, the taxpayer suffered a heart attack and was advised by his
physician to dispose of his business interests. On the basis of this advice,
he sold his stock in the corporation. The court treated the gain on the
sale of his stock as long-term capital gain, even though the sale fell
squarely within section 341. The court's rationale was that since the
taxpayer did not contemplate the sale of his stock prior to a realization
by the corporation of substantial taxable income when he made his in-
vestment, the requisite "view" was not present. This ruling is peculiar
when one considers that, (1) the regulations require that the "view"
need only exist prior to the completion of construction; " (2) the "view"
contemplated by the statute is to a sale, exchange, or distribution prior
to realization by the corporation of a substantial amount of taxable in-
come; 9" and (3) the taxpayer sold his stock prior to completion of con-
struction and before a realization by the corporation of a substantial
amount of taxable income. The court cited Lowery in its opinion, al-
though it is difficult to ascertain the principle for which it was cited.97
93. A rather interesting explanation was set forth by a federal district court judge
in his instructions to a jury in a case involving a collapsible corporation. A juror asked
the judge if a corporation could still be collapsible if it remains in the hands of some
of the shareholders.
The Court: that is a very good question, and I gave some thought to that question
and in my own mind, I reached this conclusion. That if our stockholder . . .
were the only one that sold his stock and the others did not, if he himself went
into it with that intent, it would be collapsible to the extent of his own sale, and
I based that on the language in here where it spoke of total or partial collapsibil-
ity. . . . [Sluppose there were two men in there and one of them had that intent
and as to himself he went . . . and sold his stock and that the other one kept his
permanently for investment, it's my own concept that as to the man who did sell
his stock, that it would be a collapsible corporation to the extent of his own
sale. . . .I thought that if you gave it any other interpretation, why ninety-nine
per cent could be sold and one per cent of the stock could be held and you could
say the corporation is therefore not collapsed, but is still going. Ivey v. United
States, 5 Am. FED. TAX R.2d 1076, 1083 (N.D. Ga. 1960).
94. CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) J 9690 (D.N.J., Aug. 30,
1963). This case was considered from a different viewpoint earlier. See note 71 supra.
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(3) (1963).
96. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(1)(A). See Ellsworth J. Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144
(1959).
97. The court stated that the time of the sale, standing alone, cannot be the determina-
tive factor in finding the "view," for which proposition Lowery was cited. However, there
is no language or innuendo in Lowery to rely upon for this conclusion.
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Although Shilowitz is justifiable from an equitable viewpoint, 98 it
is contrary to the regulations and the code. The court simply held that
a taxpayer can sell his interest in a potentially collapsible corporation
prior to completion of construction and prior to a realization of a sub-
stantial amount of taxable income without a "view" to doing exactly
what he did, in fact. A situation where extraneous circumstances are
present, such as a physician's advice to sell for health purposes, is of the
type that best lends itself to a revenue ruling, if one can be obtained
on so elusive an issue. The taxpayer could thereby obtain relief from
the provisions of section 341 without disturbing the balance of the code
provisions. It is not contended that a favorable ruling would necessarily
be obtained, but one can assume that the same compassion that moved
the court in Shilowitz might have a like effect on the rulings division.
An evaluation of the Lowery Line must be accomplished with cau-
tion. There have not been enough decisions dealing with the question to
indicate a definite trend. Certainly, the Tax Court has been rather
shortsighted in using strong language in its opinions, and the Court of
Claims was absolutely careless in Shilowitz. However, until a court of
appeals rules on one of these cases, it would be dangerous to rely upon
the Lowery Line.99 This line of decisions does bear watching for future
developments, and there is a strong possibility that the taxpayer will be
the beneficiary.
C. Perpetual Collapsible Status-A Negative Implication
Suppose that X Corporation is deemed collapsible because of a dis-
tribution to its shareholders in partial liquidation prior to a realization
by the corporation of a substantial part of its income. The code has no
provision relieving the corporation of its collapsible status once an event
has occurred which brings it within that definition. The question arises
whether there is any event or activity that will subsequently relieve the
corporation of its collapsible status so that a sale or exchange, or a dis-
tribution, can be made safely?
The Second Circuit, in Glickman v. Commissioner,'0 ° said by way
of dictum that a subsequent realization of a substantial amount of in-
come by the corporation will relieve the corporation of its collapsible
status."0 ' Also, the limitations in section 341(d), when applicable, will
98. The taxpayer's decision to sell was to protect his health by relieving himself of
business pressure. Undoubtedly, the "penalty" treatment in § 341(a) was not aimed at
this type of situation, although any attempt to provide a statutory exception would make
the provisions too complex to be comprehendible.
99. At the time of this writing, Lowery was on appeal to the Third Circuit. P-H FED.
TAx SER. CIT. 19, 160 (Nov. 29, 1963).
100. 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958).
101. Although the court found that the distribution and the sale of stock by the
taxpayer were part of the same transaction, it went on to say that
the statute contains no provision relieving collapsible status once an event has
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prevent the application of section 341 (a) with regard to a particular
transaction, although the limitations will not affect the corporation's col-
lapsible status."°2
The dictum in Glickman was the first formal statement by an appel-
late court regarding relief from collapsible status. However, a strict
reading of the statute demands a different conclusion, as evidenced in a
decision by the Fifth Circuit on this point. In Heft v. Commissioner,
10 3
the petitioner formed a corporation that purchased fifty-three lots and
constructed a single family dwelling on each. After sixteen of these had
been sold, a voluntary liquidation was commenced and twenty-six of the
remaining thirty-seven properties were distributed to the petitioner. The
remaining eleven properties were sold by the corporation and the pro-
ceeds were distributed to the petitioner. The Tax Court found that the
first distribution was from a collapsible corporation because only seven-
teen per cent of the total estimated gain had been realized by the cor-
poration from the sale of the sixteen houses, which did not constitute a
substantial amount of the corporation's income. 11 4 The Fifth Circuit held
that once the corporation is collapsible, it cannot purge itself of that
status by later realizing a substantial amount of income. Therefore, even
though the sale of the eleven houses plus the sale of the sixteen houses
resulted in the corporation realizing a substantial amount of the income
to be derived from the property, once the corporation was designated as
collapsible, the status remained.
This decision elevated form over substance. If the corporation in
Heft first sold the twenty-seven houses and then distributed the remain-
ing twenty-six to the taxpayer, the collapsible corporation provisions
would not have been applicable. 10 5 Yet, there is no substantive difference
between the two situations.'06
occurred which brings it within that definition .... And if, subsequent to a
condemned distribution, but prior to a stock sale, the corporation realizes a
substantial part of net income, a court should have no difficulty in holding ...
[§ 341] inapplicable to such transaction. Id. at 112.
See also Donaldson, Collapsible Corporations, 36 TAXES 777, 779 (1958).
102. Section 341(d), by its terms, presupposes that the corporation to which it is
being applied is collapsible within § 341(b). Whether the collapsible status results from
a present sale, exchange, or distribution, or a prior transaction, does not change the fact
that the corporation remains collapsible even though § 341(d) prevents the application
of § 341(a).
103. 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961).
104. The court estimated the total gain to be $45,700 on all fifty-three houses and
found the gain realized at the time of distribution to be $7,797 or 17.07%.
105. The corporation would have realized nearly 5017 of the total gain, a substantial
amount in light of the Fifth Circuit's finding that 33% is substantial. See Kelley v.
Commissioner, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961). See generally II(D) of this article's text infra.
106. The effect of the Heft doctrine on the results of future controversies is question-
able. In most situations, § 341(d) will save the taxpayer from abuse by Heft. However, one
can certainly construct a hypothet where the taxpayer will be unduly burdened by the Heft
decision. The prime example is the natural resource corporation that is engaged in con-
tinual development. The 70-30 limitation might never apply and the same might be true
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Thus far, only two circuits have ruled on this question and they
reached opposite results."' 7 The Heft holding finds justification by way
of negative implication," 8 while the Glickman dictum is more in accord
with the underlying theory of section 341.09 The strict reading of the
code demands the Heft result. The need of the business community for
specific guides is partially satisfied by the decision. The fact that there
has been only one reported case directly on point during the thirteen-
year existence of the collapsible corporation provisions may indicate that
the Heft doctrine poses no real threat to most taxpayers.
D. "Substantial"-A Double Ambiguity"0
A corporation is not collapsible under section 341 if a substantial
part of the income to be derived from its Section 341 assets has been re-
alized prior to a sale or exchange of its stock, or a distribution in respect
thereof."' The statute left to the courts the problem of deciding what
constitutes a substantial amount in a given situation. However, a seem-
ingly unanticipated controversy has developed over the following ques-
tion: To what income does substantial refer-the amount of income
realized, or the amount of income that remains to be realized? The an-
swer may occasion divergent tax consequences. 112 A literal reading of
as to the three-year rule. All that is left is the 5% limitation which, by definition, is
applicable only to shareholders owning 5% or less of the corporation.
107. To repeat, Glickman never so held but the dictum is clear. It is questionable
whether this position would be followed today in light of the Heft decision and the com-
plete absence of a statutory foundation. But see Ivey v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 799
(5th Cir. 1961), where the Fifth Circuit wrote an entirely new qualification into § 341.
See II(E) of this article's text infra.
108. Since the code does not positively provide for loss of collapsible status, once it
is obtained, there is a negative implication that it is never lost.
109. By way of the "substantial" requirement in § 341(b), the 70-30 limitation in § (d)
and the basic structure of § (e), a corporation will normally escape collapsible treatment
through one of these routes if it has realized a large portion of its income. This under-
lying theory runs through the entire section but is defeated by the Heft doctrine.
110. See generally Note, 8 N.Y.L.F. 544 (1962).
111. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(1)(A).
112. For example, assume that any amount in excess of 20% of the total income
will be considered "substantial," and that the total estimated income to be realized by X
Corporation is $1,000,000, computed as follows-200 houses to be built by December 31,
1963, at an estimated profit of $5,000 per house. A, the sole shareholder in X Corporation,
is in the 72% tax bracket for the year 1963 from income derived from sources other than
X Corporation. Consider three possible alternatives through which A could realize the
potential profit from X Corporation.
1) X Corporation sells all the houses by the end of 1963, pays the 52% corporate tax
on the $1,000,000 profits, distributes its net earnings after taxes to A who includes them
in his income as a dividend, and pays taxes on this income, at the 72% level (the dividend
credit and exclusion are ignored for purposes*of this problem). A's net disposable income
after taxes on the $1,000,000 would be $61,680 or 6.1% of the total income earned by X.
2) If "substantial" refers to the amount of income already realized then X Corpo-
ration must sell 40 houses, realizing $200,000 or 20% of estimated income in order to escape
collapsible treatment on a subsequent liquidation. If this is done and X Corporation pays
taxes on the profit, distributes this to A as a dividend, liquidates the corporation and
distributes the remaining 160 houses as a liquidating dividend to A, A would receive
property valued at $800,000 in exchange for his stock, (presumably having a nominal basis)
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the code favors the first interpretation."' However, the Internal Revenue
Service takes the position that a corporation is collapsible if, prior to the
sale of stock by the shareholders, there remains a substantial part of the
income yet to be derived from the property." 4 It is difficult to under-
stand how the Service can advocate this interpretation in light of the
"plain meaning" of the code and the adverse response by the Tax
Court." '5
The courts of appeals are divided on this issue. The Fifth Circuit
follows the Tax Court and the obvious "plain meaning" of the code," 6
and the Third Circuit supports the position of the Service." 7 The other
courts of appeals have not yet ruled on this point.
Notwithstanding the conflicting positions taken by the Service and
the Tax Court, the factual determination as to what amount of potential
income is substantial will greatly affect the practical difference between
the two positions. The following example will serve as an illustration: A
Corporation is a construction company formed for the express purpose
of building and selling a subdivision composed of ten houses. When the
ten houses were completed and four had been sold, the stockholders of
A decided to redeem all of their stock and to distribute the unsold houses
to the shareholders in exchange. Forty per cent of the total estimated
income had been realized and sixty per cent remained to be realized. As-
sume that the issue of collapsible status hinges upon whether a substan-
tial realization has occurred prior to the liquidation. If the trial court
determines that thirty-three per cent of the total estimated income repre-
sents a substantial amount, clearly the forty per cent already realized
and he would realize capital gain (presumably long-term). A's net disposable income under
the above facts would be $616,185 or 61.6% of the total profit potential.
3) If "substantial" refers to the amount of income that remains to be realized, then
X Corporation would have to sell 160 houses to escape § 341 via the collapsible route.
After a distribution of corporate income after taxes and a liquidating dividend of the
remaining 40 houses, the net disposable income in A's hands would be $383,815 or 38%
of the total potential profits.
In example 2), A has more than ten times the disposable income than in example 1),
and nearly two-thirds more than in example 3). Although the figures in the hypothet are
exaggerated, the tax benefits are present for any taxpayer who can fall within the capital
gains taxation rates. The use of 20% as "substantial" is only for illustrative purposes. See
note 119 infra and accompanying text.
113. The code states that a corporation will be collapsible if the sale, exchange, or
distribution takes place "before a realization by the corporation . . . of a substantial part
of the income to be derived from such property . . . ." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 341(b)(1)(A). (Emphasis added.)
114. Rev. Rul. 62-12, 1962-1 Cum. BULL. 321, based on Technical Information Release
No. 349, December 11, 1961.
115. The majority of the Tax Court has followed the literal interpretation. E.g., Max
N. Tobias, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. ff 40,14 (April 22, 1963); E.J. Zongker, P-H
TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. II 39,107 (March 26, 1963); Rose Sidney, 30 T.C. 1155 (1958),
aff'd, 273 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1960); J.B. Kelley, 32 T.C. 135 (1959). See also Levenson v.
United States, 157 F. Supp. 244 (D. Ala. 1957).
116. Kelley v. Commissioner, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
117. Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
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is substantial so that collapsible status will not attach if the position of
the Tax Court is followed. However, under the position advocated by the
Service, A would be a collapsible corporation because a substantial
amount-sixty per cent-remains to be realized. If the trial court deter-
mines that sixty per cent would represent a substantial amount, A would
be collapsible under both positions because a substantial amount has not
yet been realized-i.e., forty per cent-and a substantial amount re-
mains to be realized-i.e., sixty per cent.
The problem of potentially different conclusions resulting from the
two positions has not been reduced by factual determinations that sub-
stantial means an amount in excess of fifty per cent. On the contrary, the
Tax Court has leaned heavily toward low percentages."n In E. J. Zong-
ker,"9 the Tax Court found twenty-three per cent to be substantial, but
in another decision, it found that seventeen per cent was not. 2 ° If these
factual determinations can be used as respectable guides for future
litigation (and there is evidence that they can in the Tax Court)' 2 '
a taxpayer may find that with a little planning he can use the collapsible
corporation device to his tax advantage. 2 2 Of course, if a great deal
of abuse is generated by the liberality of the Tax Court, the court may
revert to the position of the Service.
Perhaps the most significant decision was the one rendered by the
Fifth Circuit in Kelley v. Commissioner.12' The court held that one-
third represents a substantial amount of income. The Service has indi-
cated that it will not acquiese to Kelley, and will oppose the taxpayer
when the amount realized is less than fifty per cent.
12
118. Based on recent cases, the delineation of "substantial" from the context of collaps-
ibility is as follows:
Case Per Cent Realized "Substantial"
Max N. Tobias 9% No
J.D. Abbott 10% No
G.A. Heft 17% No
E.J. Zongker 23% Yes
f.B. Kelley 33% Yes
A.E. Levenson 51% Yes
See respectively notes 115, 117, 120, 115, 116, 115.
119. P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 11 39,107 (March 26, 1963).
120. G. A. Heft, 34 T.C. 86 (1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961).
121. "[W]e find . .. [no case] where more than 20 percent of total net profits has
been held substantial. . . . Under no approximation of the post-sale anticipated income
could a figure be reached in comparison with which the pre-sale income would be regarded
as less than substantial." Id at 772. But see Kelley v. Commissioner, 293 F.2d 904, 913 (5th
Cir. 1961), where the court stated that the question must be resolved on the facts in each
case since the statute would have been phrased accordingly if Congress wanted the test
to be the mechanical application of a percentage.
122. See note 112 supra.
123. 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
124. Rev. Rul. 62-12, 1962-1 Cum. BuLL. 321.
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From a planning viewpoint, fifty per cent or more represents a safe
position. If litigation is economically feasible, thirty-three per cent
should be sufficient to escape section 341, at least in the Fifth Circuit.
And for those daring taxpayers, or those that are ill-advised, E. I.
Zongker provides some authority, however tenuous it may be, for a
determination of substantial realization when less than thirty-three
per cent has been realized.
The effectiveness of section 341 in preventing the collapsible corpo-
ration abuse has been reduced by the liberality of the courts in interpre-
ting the word "substantial." However, the Service's position does not offer
the proper solution. Regulations could be enacted to raise a presumption
of substantial realization when an arbitrary amount (perhaps fifty per
cent) of total estimated income has been realized. However, there are
problems with this approach. For example, when the income being esti-
mated is rental income, the courts must consider such factors as estimated
useful life of the property, estimated occupancy, and others. However,
as long as the collapsible corporation provisions necessitate the compu-
tation of total estimated income, there will. remain the difficulty of
projecting the amounts of these factors.
E. Braunstein v. Commissioner-The "Ivey" Is Cut
Although the basic purpose of the collapsible corporation provisions
is to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain through
the use of the corporate device, the statute itself does not approach the
problem in these terms.'25 Thus, it is possible to fall within the pro-
visions of the statute and receive ordinary income treatment notwith-
standing that the taxpayer would have been entitled to capital gain
treatment if a corporate entity had not been used.12 In 1958, Congress
reacted to this problem by adding section 341 (e) to the code 2 7 which, as
described below, provides a measure of relief in this area. 2 ' Subsequent
to this amendment, however, the Fifth Circuit advanced a judicial solu-
tion to the same problem,'1 2 and thereby laid the predicate for circuit
disharmony and Supreme Court settlement.
125. See chart on page 650 supra.
126. For example, if a taxpayer constructs an apartment as an investment and later
decides to sell the building because of a good offer before the apartment is complete, he is
normally entitled to treat his gain (or loss) on the sale as one from the sale of a capital
asset. However, if the same facts occur and a corporation is used, there is a good possibility
that the sale will fall within the collapsible corporation provisions.
127. 72 Stat. 1615, adding § 341(e) to the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
128. A proposed amendment to section 341(e) was recently released from committee.
See H.R. 7301, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963) (UTT Bill).
129. Although the Fifth Circuit solution was advanced after the Technical Amend-
ments Act was passed, the act itself was not applicable to the facts in that case because the
facts had transpired prior to the act's passage, and the act was specifically limited to facts
that occurred subsequent to its passage.
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In Ivey v. Commissioner,8 ' the taxpayer and two associates formed
a corporation, each receiving one-third of the capital stock.' Later, the
plaintiff132 transferred a parcel of land with a basis of 45,000 dollars to
the corporation in exchange for the corporation's note of 25,000 dollars
and 250 shares of stock having an aggregate par value of 25,000 dollars.
Construction of an apartment house was begun on the property, and
when the building was seventy-five per cent complete, the plaintiff sold
all his stock in the corporation for 100,000 dollars, realizing a gain
of 55,000 dollars.' The government asserted that the gain was from
the sale of stock in a collapsible corporation and subject to tax at
ordinary income rates. The taxpayer contended that the gain was from
the sale of a long-term capital investment and entitled to long-term
capital gain treatment. The district court rendered a judgment from
which both parties appealed.' The government's contention on appeal
was that the judge incorrectly instructed the jury in stating that the
requisite intent to collapse must exist at the time one becomes a stock-
holder; that is, before construction is begun.' The taxpayer based his
appeal on the argument that the collapsible corporation had not been
used.' 6 The court of appeals adopted the taxpayer's contention and
held that the collapsible corporation provisions will not apply if the
income would have been taxed as capital gain to -the individual in the
absence of a corporation. The case was remanded to the trial court
for determination of the nature of the gain to the individual. The court
justified its holding in several ways. First, it examined the Senate Com-
mittee Report accompanying the Technical Amendments Act of 1958
130. 294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961).
131. The reported facts do not indicate the amount or the value of the original capital
stock issued to the three incorporators.
132. The opinion states that "they transferred" the property to the corporation, imply-
ing that all three incorporators made the transfer. Ivey v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 799, 801
(5th Cir. 1961). However, it is also stated that the taxpayer (Harold Ivey) owned the lot
and that he alone received the stock and the note given in exchange for the property.
133. The report of the facts raises certain implications as to certain facts that were
not indicated. The court said that the gain to the taxpayer from the sale of stock was
$55,000. Therefore, the basis of the stock sold must have been $45,000, the exact value of
the property transferred to the corporation. However, the taxpayer received a note for
$25,000 and stock with a par value of $25,000. Assuming the par value of the stock re-
flected its actual value at that time, the taxpayer realized a gain of $5,000 on this transfer.
If the gain was recognized at this time, then his basis for the note and the stock was
$25,000 each. In order for him to have sold stock with a basis of $45,000, the basis of the
original shares issued equally to each of the three incorporators must have been $20,000
each. Thus, after the transfer' of the property, the taxpayer must have owned 45/85 of the
capital stock of the corporation or 53%. This would make him the controlling stockholder.
Thus, his "view" to the sale of his stock prior to the completion of construction was the
"view" of those in control of the policies of the corporation, making the Lowery Line doc-
trine inapplicable. See II (B) of this article's text supra.
134. Although no report of the decision by the district court is available, an edited ver-
sion of the trial judge's instructions to the jury can be found in 5 A.m. FED. TAX R.2d 1076
(1960).
135..294 F.2d 799, 800 (5th Cir. 1961).
136. Ibid.
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which added section 341(e), and found that the committee had been
concerned with the same problem.137 Since section 341 (e) did not apply
to Ivey,' the court felt justified in offering judicial relief. Second, it
relied upon a revenue ruling 3' which stated that when a corporation
holding the stock of a collapsible corporation sells the stock and realizes
ordinary income on the gain, the gain realized on a subsequent liquida-
tion of the "holding" corporation will not fall within section 341 (a). 40
The Service justified this ruling by reasoning that although the subse-
quent liquidation fell within the literal reading of the statute, "to impose
the tax treatment provided for in section 341 (a) of the code twice as
to the same underlying collapsible property would extend the statute
beyond its intended purpose."'' The Fifth Circuit interpreted this ruling
as an invitation to the courts to ignore the wording of the statute, if
necessary, to prevent its application beyond the intended purpose.'42
Third, the court, after paying proper judicial respect to the "plain
meaning rule," rejected it in favor of the "legislative intent" doctrine,
and found that the legislative intent was not satisfied unless the decisions
was rendered as it was.'3 Fourth, the court examined the general pattern
of capital gains-ordinary income taxation and found that to construe
the statute otherwise would be inconsistent with this pattern. Finally,
the court examined a prior district court decision that was substantially
in accord with its own conclusions.
44
A subsequent petition for rehearing was denied with an opinion
which "clarified" the court's earlier decision.145 It was stated that:
The proper approach for the court to follow is to determine first
whether the collapsible corporation provisions in terms apply
to the transaction in question. If they apply, the taxpayer
should be allowed to show that in the absence of a corporation
he would have been entitled to treat all or part of his gain as
137. Id. at 802.
138. See note 129 supra.
139. Rev. Rul. 56-50, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 174.
140. Supra note 135, at 802-03.
141. Supra note 139, at 175.
142. The fallacy in relying on the revenue ruling lies in the fact that the Treasury in-
dicated its policy only so far as the specific factual situation and did not acquiese to the
taxpayer's contention in Ivey. If it had, the case would never have come to trial.
143. Supra note 135, at 803-04.
144. Supra note 135, at 804. The court discussed Honaker Drilling, Inc. v. Koehler, 190
F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960). That case represents a classic example of a natural resources
development corporation that is unduly mistreated by the interplay of the collapsible cor-
poration provisions and § 263(c) of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, permitting the expensing
of intangible drilling and development costs as they are incurred. The development corpora-
tion may be in existence a long time before realizing a "substantial" amount of income,
because costs of drilling and development, though responsible for producing future income,
are immediately expensed, thereby reducing income realized until the latter years of produc-
tion. This problem area was noted in the 1958 report of the Senate Finance Committee. U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4820 (1958). See Rev. Rul. 57-246, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 236.
145. 303 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1962).
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a long-term capital gain. To the extent that the taxpayer can
make this showing he is entitled to relief from the statute's
literal application . . . . The remainder of the gain should be
taxed at regular income rates as provided by the statute.'46
The reaction to Ivey was less than enthusiastic,' 47 and the indi-
viduality of the Fifth Circuit was short-lived. Some two months after
the rehearing was denied, the Second Circuit was faced with the same
problem. In that case, Braunstein v. Commissioner,'48 the taxpayers in-
corporated in 1940, and constructed two apartment houses under two
separate corporations. In 1948, they received an F.H.A. mortgage com-
mitment which, in fact, exceeded the eventual construction cost. The
excess mortgage proceeds were distributed in the form of dividends,
although they actually represented a return of capital because there
was no surplus at the time of distribution.'49 In 1950, the taxpayers sold
their stock in the corporation and treated the excess of both the money
received and the mortgage proceeds, over the basis of their stock, as
long-term capital gain. In the Tax Court,'5" the application of section
117(m) evolved around the factual determination of whether the "view"
properly existed prior to the sale. The Tax Court properly concluded
that the sale of the stock and the distributions were attributable to cir-
cumstances which were present prior to the completion of construction.
The taxpayer raised three arguments on appeal,' 5 ' the one relevant here
being that section 117(m) is inapplicable if the constructed apartment
buildings would have produced capital gain on a sale by the taxpayer
had no corporation been formed. The court rejected this argument and
the Ivey case, its rationale being that courts interpret laws and do not
create them, and also that Congress had already provided a solution. 15 2
146. Id. at 110.
147. In the following cases, the courts rejected Ivey: Braunstein v. Commissioner, 305
F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962); Max N. Tobias, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 9 40,14 (April
22, 1963); Sproul Realty Co., 38 T.C. 844, 857-58 (1962).
148. 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962).
149. Of course, the distribution is a return of capital only in the economic sense, and
only when the distribution does not exceed the contributed capital. The asset position is
reduced and since the liabilities are not reduced, the corresponding reduction must be from
net worth. The argument can be made that the reason a loan was extended in excess of ac-
tual cost was because of unrecognized appreciation in value of the asset. However, this is a
weak argument in view of the fact that the mortgage commitment was extended before the
asset was constructed. The real reason for the higher cost estimates by mortgage companies
generally is the fact that much of the work to be done by outside contractors is actually
done by the stockholders. If this is the case, then the distribution is more analogous to
salaries than to dividends.
150. Benjamin Braunstein, 36 T.C. 22 (1961).
151. The three arguments on appeal were: 1) that the taxpayer did not have the req-
uisite "view" (note 148, supra at 951-56) ; 2) that not more than 70% of the gain was at-
tributable to the constructed asset (supra note 148 at 956-57) ; and 3) section 117(m) does
not apply if the assets would have produced capital gain in the absence of a corporation
(supra note 148 at 957-59).
152. Supra note 148, at 957-59.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari'58 to settle the conflict be-
tween the Second and Fifth Circuits.,Justice Harlan wrote the opinion for
the majority of the Court and affirmed the holding by the Second Cir-
cuit.' In so deciding the Court advanced several arguments to support its
position. First, to hold otherwise would be wholly inconsistent with the
"plain meaning" of the statute. 55 Second, there is no evidence in the
legislative history of the statute to indicate a congressional desire for
the courts to depart from the statutory definition of a collapsible corpo-
ration. On the contrary, the drawing of arbitrary lines (as in section
341(d) raises the opposite implication.5 6  The Court also raised some
practical problems in applying the Ivey solution.
5 7
Although the demise of Ivey was inevitable, it is puzzling why such
a broad step was taken in the first place by the Fifth Circuit in light of
the facts in that case. Certainly, equity did not demand relief. The
fact that the court sent the case back to the trial court to determine the
tax status of the transaction in the absence of a corporation indicates
that the facts before the court did not demand such a radical decision.' 58
The following section treats the legislative solution to the Ivey problem.
F. Section 341(e)-The Objective Exceptions
In 1958, Congress enacted the Technical Amendments Act. 159 The
purpose of this bill was to correct inadvertent errors and ambiguities in
153. 371 U.S. 933 (1962).
154. 374 U.S. 65 (1963). The exact question on review was:
Whether Section 117(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 . . . which provides
that gain "from the sale or exchange . . . of stock of a collapsible corporation" is
taxable as ordinary income rather than capital gain, is inapplicable in circumstances
where the stockholders would have been entitled to capital-gains treatment had
they conducted the enterprise in their individual capacities without utilizing a cor-
poration. Id at 68.
155. "There is nothing in the language or structure of the section to demand or even
justify reading into these provisions the additional requirement that the taxpayer must in
fact have been using the corporate form as a device to convert ordinary income into capital
gain." Id at 70.
156. Ibid.
157. For example, if we were to inquire whether or not the profit would have
been ordinary income had an enterprise been individually owned, would we treat
each taxpaying shareholder differently and look only to his trade or business or
would we consider the matter in terms of the trade or business of any or at least
a substantial number of the shareholders? . . . [W]hat if the individual in question
is not himself engaged in any trade or business but owns stock in varying amounts
in a number of corporate ventures other than the one before the court? Do we
pierce each of the corporate veils, regardless of the extent and share of the individ-
ual's investment, and charge him without being in the trade or business of each such
corporation? Id at 68.
158. It seems that the court was taken in by the taxpayer's argument, without really
considering the code. This is certainly a credit to the taxpayer's counsel, but leaves doubts
as to the competency of the court.
159. INT. Rav. COnE OF 1954, § 341(e), as amended, 72 Stat. 1615 (1958).
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the tax statutes. 6 ° In- reference to the addition of subsection (e) to
section 341, the Senate Report said:
The collapsible-corporation provisions of present law . . . are
so broad that in a number of situations they may have exactly
the opposite effect from that intended-instead of preventing
the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain, they may
instead convert what would otherwise be capital gain into ordi-
nary income. 6'
The applicability of the pre-1958 law depended upon the subjective
intent of the parties, a matter which had proved difficult to determine.'6"
Also, if section 341 does apply, the entire gain is taxed as ordinary in-
come regardless of the fact that if a corporate entity had not been used,
a large portion of the gain would have received capital gain treatment.
As was mentioned previously, there are three limitations on the
application of the collapsible corporation provisions. 65 However, these
limitations do not solve the above mentioned problems. For example,
in the case of corporations engaged in the development of natural re-
sources which have a substantial amount of development activity, the
shareholders can never really be certain as to their collapsible status.'64
Section 341(e) provides exceptions to the collapsible corporation
provisions. These exceptions are determined on a wholly objective basis,
thus eliminating the subjective "view" requirement.'65
The four exceptions relate to: (1) sales or exchanges of stock;166
(2) certain distributions in complete liquidation taxed as capital gains
under section 331; 1 7 (3) certain complete liquidations for which non-
recognition treatment is provided under section 333;168 and (4) certain
sales or exchanges of property by the corporation under section 337.169
A corporation will come within these four exceptions only if the net
unrealized appreciation of "ordinary income" assets 7 ° of the corporation
160. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 818 (1958).
161. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 818, 866 (1958).
162. See generally II (A), (B) of this article's text supra.
163. See chart at page 650 and notes 34-37 supra.
164. At any given point in time, it would be impossible to determine the total in-
come to be derived from the property if exploration was still in progress. Therefore, the
three-year limitation and the 70-30 limitation would be useless. The 5% limitation only
affects the very small minority shareholders. Finally, an escape from § 341 through the
"substantial" route would be dangerous because total estimated income would be difficult,
if not impossible, to ascertain.
165. If the provisions of § (e) are not complied with, §§ 341(a)-(d) are called into
play and an independent determination as to qualification thereunder is made.
166. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e)(1).
167. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e)(2).
168. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e)(3).
169. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e) (4).
170. The code does not use the term "ordinary income" assets; it is designated therein
as "SuBsEcTroN 341(E) ASSETS." However, the more descriptive phrase "ordinary income"
assets will be used in this paper. See § 341(e)(5).
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does not exceed fifteen per cent of its net worth.""- If any shareholder
of the corporation owns more than twenty per cent of the corporation's
stock, the "ordinary income" assets of the corporation include those
additional assets of the corporation which, if sold at a gain by the
shareholder, would result in the imposition of an ordinary income tax
on the shareholder.
1 7 2
The qualification as to "ordinary income" assets is applied on a
shareholder-by-shareholder basis in the following two situations. First,
it is applied where a shareholder owns more than twenty per cent of the
corporation's stock and owns or owned more than twenty per cent of
the stock of another corporation within the preceding three years, and
more than seventy per cent of the other corporation's assets that are or
were of a similar nature178 with regard to more than seventy per cent
of the assets of the corporation." 4 Similarly, any sales or exchanges of
assets by the other corporation which qualifies under section 337(a) will
be considered sales or exchanges by the shareholderY.15 This provision
was added to prevent avoidance of collapsible status by an individual
through the use of a separate corporation for each venture. Second, it
is applied on a shareholder-by-shareholder basis when the shareholder
owns between five and twenty per cent of the corporation's stock.77 As
to each shareholder within this group, there is taken into account the net
unrealized appreciation in assets of the corporation which would be
"ordinary income" assets under the definition if the shareholder had
owned more than twenty per cent in value of the corporation's stock.
The purpose of these tests is to insure that the amount of unrealized
ordinary income is relatively small in proportion to the total assets of
the corporation and that the tax status of the shareholders is included
in this determination. Thus, the character of the income cannot be
changed merely by using the corporate entity.
Additional requirements are imposed in the case of a complete
liquidation, as distinguished from a sale of shares. The purpose of these
requirements is to prevent the shareholders from liquidating their cor-
poration, paying a capital gains tax on the excess of the fair market
value of the distributed property over the basis of the stock surrendered,
and then obtaining a stepped-up basis for depreciable assets. This depre-
ciation could also be used to reduce ordinary income earned from the
171. The requirement that the "ordinary income" assets do not exceed 15% of net
worth represents the essence of this exception.
172. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 341(e)(5)(i), (5)(iii).
173. The code uses the terminology, "assets similar or related in service or use," but the
apparent vagueness of these terms is essentially the same. Thus far, no regulations have
been issued under § (e).
174. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e)(5) (A).
175. Ibid.
176. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e)(5)(B).
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assets. Thus, in order for a distribution in complete liquidation under
section 331 to qualify under subsection (e), three additional conditions
must be met: (1) substantially all the properties of the liquidating
corporation must be sold within a twelve-month period beginning on the
date of the adoption of the plan for complete liquidation; 177 (2) no
distribution of depreciable, depletable or amortizable property can be
made to shareholders once the plan has been adopted;' 78 and (3) sales
or exchanges of property made by the corporation within the twelve-
month period must qualify under section 337.179
The preceding description, though simplified, serves to illustrate the
objectives and the general structure of subsection (e). To date, no regu-
lations have been issued either to explain the operation of subsection (e)
or to clear up possible ambiguities. Further, no decisions relating to the
provision have been reported and only one revenue ruling has been
issued.' The committtee reports, however, give the following example
in regard to subsection (e):
Assume that the sole asset of a corporation is appreciated land,
and that the corporation is not a dealer in such property. If no
shareholder of the corporation owning more than 20 percent of
the corporation's stock is a dealer in such land (and if no more-
than-20-percent shareholder owns or has owned, within the pre-
ceding three years, more than 20 percent of the stock in a
corporation more than 70 percent in value of whose assets are
property similar or related in service or use to the assets of this
corporation) then gain from sale of stock by any shareholder
owning more than 20 percent of the corporation's stock will not
come within the provisions of section 341(a). If, on the other
hand, a shareholder owning more than 20 percent in the value
of the corporation's stock is a dealer in land, no sale of stock
by any shareholder in the corporation will come within the
statutory exception. . . . If no shareholder owning more than
20 percent of the corporation's stock is a dealer in land, but a
21 percent shareholder has owned and sold, within the past 3
years, similar stock interests in corporations having similar
property, then such sales of stock shall be taken into account,
as to that shareholder only, in ascertaining whether he is a
dealer and therefore is prevented from coming under the excep-
tion. Similarly, if no shareholder owning more than 20 percent
in value of the corporation's stock is a dealer in such land, a
sale of stock by the 6 percent shareholder will not qualify under
the exception, notwithstanding the face that sales of stock by
other shareholders may qualify. 8'
177. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e) (2).
178. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 341(e) (4) (C).
179. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e) (2).
180. Rev. Rul. 63-125, 1963 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 27, at 8.
181. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 818 (1958). For additional discussion of
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It can readily be seen that subsection (e) does not solve all the
problems. First, if the taxpayer fails to meet one of the technical re-
quirements he must look elsewhere for relief, notwithstanding the fact
that the failure was only minimal. Second, a stock redemption cannot
qualify under subsection (e),182 nor can a distribution of excess mortgage
proceeds. Third, distributions in an ordinary taxable liquidation cannot
qualify unless the three additional requirements are met. 8
III. CONCLUSION
Although the collapsible corporation provisions were enacted as a
statutory weapon to prevent a specific tax avoidance device, their presence
also allows a degree of security to taxpayers by providing fixed limits
within which to work. When a stockholder in a close corporation decides
to liquidate his investment,8 4 section 341 should be of prime considera-
tion, both as to timing and method of liquidation.
Logically, subsection (e) should be first consulted, because compli-
ance with its technical provisions renders the entire section inapplicable,
and the taxpayer can plan his liquidation on non-tax considerations.'
If the technicalities of this provision are not satisfied, subsection (d)
should be consulted next. Compliance with any of the three limitations
in subsection (d) will prevent the operation of the penalty provision in
subsection (a), but the corporation may remain collapsible for other
purposes. 8 6
Failure to comply with subsection (d) forces the taxpayer to find
solace in subsection (b). Several avenues of escape are present there,
but the entire subsection provides tenuous grounds because of the lack
of firm lines of demarcation between compliance and non-compliance.
The argument that no "view" was present during construction offers a
possibility, but the regulations have been so broadly constructed,8 7 and
in turn, have been so broadly construed, that it is difficult to remain
outside their scope. Of course, if the taxpayer owns a minority interest
and the majority continues in control, the Lowery Line can be used to
bolster the lack of "view" argument.'
§ 341(e), See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, REPORT OF WORKING VIEWS OF A STUDY BY THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
STAFF AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION LIAISON COMMITTEE 153,
241-59 (1958) ; Modrall, Collapsible Corporations and Subsection (e), 37 TAXES 895 (1959) ;
Peel, Recent Collapsible Developments: Inadvertent Collapsibility, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON
FED TAX 850 (1962); Note, 51 GEO. L.J. 346, 353-85 (1963).
182. Section 341 (e) makes no provision for a stock redemption in partial liquidation.
183. See notes 169-71 supra and accompanying text.
184. The collapsible corporation provisions are applicable only to close corporations in
all but most unusual circumstances because the opportunity to manipulate to the required
degree would be difficult in a widely held corporation.
185. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 341(e)(1)-(4).
186. See note 17 supra.
187. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
188. See II(B) of this article's text supra.
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The taxpayer can argue that a substantial amount of income has
been realized,'89 but if the amount realized is less than fifty per cent
of total estimated income, resistance from the Internal Revenue Service
can be expected, and the taxpayer should be prepared to litigate. 9 °
If the taxpayer is unsuccessful in escaping section 341, he can post-
pone his liquidation until a more opportune moment, or he can pay the
ordinary income tax on the gain. However, it should be noted that sec-
tion 341 applies only to shareholder gains. Therefore, any gain realized
on a liquidation that falls within the purview of section 341 will not
be subject to tax on the corporate level.' 91 It is also possible for the
corporation to dispose of its assets first, thereby realizing all its income,
and then distributing the proceeds to its shareholders. Any gain realized
upon this disposition would be subject to the fifty-two per cent corporate
tax (or the twenty-five per cent capital gains rate if the particular asset
is a section 1231 asset), but any gain to the shareholder on the liquida-
ting dividend would receive capital treatment, the corporation having lost
the collapsible status when it realized all of its income. In an appropriate
situation, substantial tax saving can be obtained through the "disposition
first-then distribute" approach. 9 '
189. See II(D) of this article's text supra.
190. The Internal Revenue's non-acquiescence to the Kelley decision, supra note 124,
and the cases that have been litigated, indicate that the Service will not press the "sub-
stantial" issue if the amount realized exceeds 50%. There is no ruling to this effect, but by
virtue of the absence of any decisions in which the amount realized exceeded 50%, the
conclusion seems reasonable.
191. For taxpayers in the lower brackets, the advantage of capital gain taxation is
relatively insignificant. The elimination of the intervening corporate tax by collapsing the
income into a lump-sum may have tax advantages over the alternative of allowing all the
income to pass through the corporation first.
192. For example, suppose that X Corporation was formed for the purpose of con-
structing an apartment house, and that the original incorporators, A and B, each own 50%
of the stock. The building was started in June, 1955, and prior to its completion in June,
1958, A and B decide they would like to liquidate the corporation. At the time of this de-
cision, the apartment house had cost $1,000,000 to construct, but due to an announcement
by an aircraft firm to build a plant in the area, the fair market value had risen to $1,500,000.
Presumably, any attempt to liquidate their investment at this time would fall within § 341
and A and B would each realize ordinary income of $250,000. Suppose, however, that A and
B attempt to liquidate the corporation under § 337 but are prevented from so doing be-
cause the corporation is collapsible within § 341(b). In this example the corporation has
liquidated its assets and has realized a gain of $500,000. This gain is included in X Corpora-
tion's taxable income for that year and is subject to the 52% corporate tax amounting to
$254,500. This leaves $245,500 available as a liquidating dividend to A and B in exchange
for their stock. However, since all the income of X Corporation had been realized prior
to the distribution, the gain would be taxable as capital gain. The maximum tax on the
capital gain (assuming it is long-term) to A and B would be 25%, or $61,375, leaving A
and B the combined income after taxes of $184,125 or $92,062.50 each. Percentage-wise, the
net income after taxes represents 36.8% of the total gain, the gain being taxed at an average
rate of 63.2%. Obviously, any taxpayer who is already in a bracket in this vicinity would
reduce his overall tax bill by liquidating first and then distributing. See Sproul Realty Co.,
38 T.C. 844 (1962).
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Writers have criticized 193 and advocated changes'94 in the collapsible
corporation provisions, even though the statute has curbed flagrant
abuses. It is the writer's position that remedial collapsible corporation
provisions have performed the function for which they were intended;
more cannot be expected under our taxing system.
193. Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and Collapsible
Amendment, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1146, 1176, 1178 (1958); Cavitch, Collapsible Corporations,
W. RES. L. REV. 278, 289 (1962).
194. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS, REPORT OF WORKING VIEWS OF A STUDY BY THE STAFF AND AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION LIAISON COMMITTEE 153, 158-63, 186-201 (1958); Note,
1960 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 855; SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY GROUP-REPEAL OF SECTION 341
AND SUBSTITUTION OP SECTION 343. See also note 128 supra.
